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Abstract— Collaborative governance plays a critical 
role in guiding the whole supply chain to achieve its 
strategic goals. This study aims to examine the impact 
of information provided via the disclosure of 
intellectual capital on the cost of equity capital. It also 
examines the effect of good corporate governance on 
the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure 
and supply chain. It examines firms listed on the 
Indonesian stock exchange for period 2013 to 2015. 
Data were analyzed using moderated regression 
analysis. Results show that intellectual capital affects 
the increase of cost of capital. Good corporate 
governance variable has significant positive effect on 
cost of capital. Corporate governance could serve as a 
determinant that influences capital expenditures by 
investors. The cost of capital is negatively affected by 
the interaction between intellectual capital disclosure 
index and good corporate governance. This means 
that the negative impact of intellectual capital 
disclosure index on cost of capital is negatively 
moderated by good corporate governance. Finally it 
can be concluded that supply chains face increased 
pressure from stakeholders to incorporate a plethora 
of corporate responsibility and sustainability aspects 
in their constituents’ business practices.  
 
Keywords— Supply Chain Management, Collaborative 
Governance, Cost of capital, Disclosure. 
1. Introduction 
Essentially, SCM is the management or governance 
of inter-organizational relationships. It is widely 
acknowledged that without appropriate governance 
mechanisms, supply chain collaboration is always 
short-lived and doomed to failure In the current era 
of knowledge-based and technology-based 
economies, companies are required to allocate 
more  investment in research and development, 
employee training, and superior new technologies 
[1]. Around 50% to 90% of the value created by the 
firm in this era is the result of the management of 
intellectual capital [2]. This is in line with the 
statement of [3] that about 75% of the company's 
market value  in America is the result of intangible 
assets. Thus, the role of intellectual capital in the 
acquisition of corporate value in this era of 
knowledge and globalization  is enormous. 
Since 1990, attention to intangible assets 
management practices has been increasing widely. 
One approach used in the assessment and 
measurement of intangible assets is the intellectual 
capital that has become the focus of attention in 
various fields, such as management, information 
technology, sociology, and accounting [4]. Some 
studies indicate that intellectual capital plays a 
significant role in the improvement of corporate 
value, among others, [5-8]. 
By  having a strong and well-managed   intellectual 
capital, the company   will   be   able   to   
anticipate   future  environmental uncertainty. If  
the company provides intensive and sustainable 
training  and employee  skills  development, 
applying  adequate information   technology, and  
maintaining   good  relationships with customers 
and suppliers, it will be able to anticipate the 
possibility the entry of new competitors. 
If one day a new competitor enters, then the 
company should be able to survive because of the 
support of intellectualcapital. [3] argue that 
intellectual capital plays an important role in 
preparing the company's competitive strategy 
advantage. 
The empowerment of intellectual capital not only 
improve performance from within the company  
but also gain  investor confidence in the ability of 
the company. [6] posit that if the market is 
efficient, then investors will give higher value to 
firms with higher intellectual capital. The financial 
statements are unable to reflect the ownership of 
the intangible assets so as to increase the 
investment risk thereby eliminating investor 
confidence [9] and [10]. İn addition, [7] show that 
the company's intellectual capital had an effect on 
the company's future performance as measured by 
stock return change one year ahead. On the one 
hand, there are problems as intellectual capital is 
difficult to measure  and cannot be reported in the 
company's financial statements. One way that can 
be done is to provide information about this 
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intellectual capital to investors through voluntary 
disclosure in the company's annualreport. İn this 
respect, [11] state that the disclosure of one aspect 
of intellectual capital i.e., human capital proved to 
have a significant impact on stockreturns of 1 year 
or 5 years later. Study by [12] analyzes the 
reporting of intellectual capital on the 20 best 
companies in Australia and show that the 
company’s overall emphasis is that intellectual 
capital is critical to achieving success in the face of 
future competition. İn addition, [13] examine the 
voluntary reporting of intellectual capital by firms 
in Australia and Hong Kong. Their results indicate 
that the level of intellectual capital disclosure is 
quite low qualitatively in both Australia and Hong 
Kong. 
Another factor that is also proven to increase 
investor’s assessment of corporate performance is 
good corporate governance (GCG). The influence 
of corporate governance on corporate value is due 
to agency problems within the company arising as a 
result of the separation of control and ownership. 
This separation creates a conflict of interest that 
will ultimately negatively affect the company’s 
value. Implementation of GCG within the company 
is expected to reduce the agency problem, so in the 
end it is expected to increase the value of the 
company. Some empirical studies that examine the 
relationship of corporate governance practice and 
the value or performance of the firm try to 
accommodate some components of corporate 
governance practice by developing and/or using an 
index or corporate    governance    practice    
ranking. 
The    corporate governance index or rank is a 
scoring based on the quantification of the 
evaluation of corporate governance components in 
the enterprise. The index score or corporate 
governance rating is then tested in relation to the 
performance or value of the firm.  One study, [14], 
find that the implementation of corporate 
governance can increase the company’s stock 
returns. The other study by [15] show that the 
corporate governance index is positively correlated 
with the operational performance and market 
valuation. Other studies by [16-20], report almost 
similar  to those of [15]. 
The quality of accounting information can reduce 
the information risk so that in the end it will also 
reduce the cost of equity capital. Previous studies, 
for example [21-26] have shown a negative 
relationship between information quality and cost 
of equity capital. The argument behind this 
intuition is that improving the quality of 
information  will lower the information asymmetry. 
Reduced information  asymmetry and increased 
stockliquidity would lower transaction costs that 
will ultimately lower cost of equity capital, see for 
example [27-29]. 
This study examines the impact of information 
provided via the disclosure of intellectual capital on 
the cost of equity capital. It also examines GCG as 
a factor affecting the relationship between 
intellectual capital disclosure and capital  cost. This 
research is important given the important role of 
intellectual capital in corporate development and 
the delivery of intellectual capital information to 
investors in order to reduce capital costs due to the 
existence of information asymmetry. The role of 
GCG as a monitoring tool for corporate managers 
will also be examined by including the role of GCG 
in moderating the relationship between intellectual 
capital information disclosure and capital cost. The 
results of this study are expected to contribute to 
the development and management of intellectual 
capital in Indonesia. [28]. 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Agency Theory 
Supply chains face increased pressure from 
stakeholders to incorporate a plethora of corporate 
responsibility and sustainability aspects in their 
constituents’ business practices. Legal and extra-
legal demands are dynamically changing; almost no 
industry, supply chain, organization, and an 
organizational function are unaffected. Owing to 
the outsourcing wave of the last decade, in 
particular purchasing and supply management 
(PSM) plays an ever more important role in 
assuring sustainable supply chains in the 
marketplace. As shown in [29], the agency theory 
assumes that all individuals act on their behalf. 
They define agency relationship as “a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent” (p. 
5). The agency relationship between agent and 
principal within the company can occur for 
example, between managers and shareholders or 
bondholders, between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders, and between managers and 
suppliers. 
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In the contract theory or agency theory, the 
corporate entity is seen as the ‘nexus of contract’, a 
group of interested parties and each party has rights 
as stated in their respective contracts, see [29] and 
[30]. Each individual in this contract has an 
incentive to maximize their respective interests, 
resulting in agency costs that can reduce firm value 
[31]. 
Firms often differ in quality, whether in the form of 
goods and services, information, and investment 
opportunities, or in the securities of their entity-in 
the form of stocks, bonds, or other valuable 
securities [12]. Given the asymmetry of 
information occurring in the capital market, those 
with more information (e.g., insiders) will take 
advantage of the opportunity to gain higher returns 
than the less well informed parties. To reduce 
information asymmetry, and to differentiate high 
quality firms from other low quality companies, 
high-type managers send signals in the form of 
information to the market [12]. A signal can be 
defined as “... an action taken by a high-type 
manager that would not be rational if that low-
type”. Signal mechanisms can be diverse, such as 
signals conveyed by high-quality managers in the 
form of more informative  intellectual capital 
disclosures. 
2.2 Intellectual Capital Disclosures and Cost of 
Capital 
Disclosure of information in the annual reports is 
expected to reduce information asymmetry and also 
reduce agency problem [13]. Theoretically,  
increased disclosure by firms can lower transaction 
costs thus increasing stock liquidity and decreasing 
uncertainty as well as reducing the adverse 
selection issues [28]. Better voluntary disclosure 
will also improve  market performance [15]. The 
decision to disclose additional information must be 
based on the cost-benefit considerations. 
The company may provide information  to  
stakeholders regarding the operations of activities 
and the impact of these activities. One of the 
company’s operating activities is the disclosure of 
the company's intellectual capital. Good disclosures 
are expected to reduce the information asymmetry 
between management and investors so as to reduce 
the cost of company’s capital. Some studies 
indicate positive influence of voluntary disclosure 
that is lowering cost of capital [21]. Thus, better 
intellectual capital disclosures will decrease the 
cost of capital. This argument leads to the 
following  hypothesis. 
H1: Intellectual capital disclosures lower  the cost 
of capital. 
2.3 Good Corporate Governance, Intellectual 
Capital Disclosures and Cost of Capital 
Corporate governance is one of the mechanisms 
aimed at minimizing agency conflicts by aligning 
relationships among stakeholders to determine the 
direction and control of the company performance. 
How the owner can monitor and control the 
decisions and actions of the top managers will 
influence the implementation of corporate strategy. 
Effective corporate governance will align  the 
interests of managers and owners so as to produce a 
competitive advantage for the company. 
The principles of GCG are fairness,  transparency, 
accountability, and responsibility. Justice with 
respect  to fairness and equality of the treatment of 
minority  shareholders to be protected from fraud, 
trafficking and abuse by insiders (self-dealing or 
insider wrong doing). Transparency is  carried out   
through  accurate   and  timely    disclosure   of   
company performance information. Management 
accountability is exercised through effective 
oversight based on the balance of power between 
supervisors, managers, shareholders, and auditors. 
The company’s responsibilities relates to the 
company as a member of society to obey the law 
and to act wisely in the environment in which it 
operates. 
According to the agency theory, GCG mechanisms 
and voluntary disclosure can be used to protect 
investors and reduce conflicts of interest between 
owners and agents. This  theory also states that 
disclosure will lower agency costs [29]. GCG 
mechanisms will be able to pressure managers to 
better disclose information Voluntary  disclosure 
will reduce information asymmetry and will 
ultimately have an impact on capital cost 
reductions. This negative impact will also depend 
on the company's management condition. If the 
company is well managed, this condition will 
strengthen the impact of intellectual capital 
disclosure on the reduction of capital costs. Thus 
the following  hypothesis is proposed. 
 
H2: Good corporate governance reduces the effect 
of intellectual capital disclosures on cost of capital 
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3. Methods 
3.1 The Model 
In order to manage supply chain risks, supply 
management must ensure that their local and 
international practices and relationships comply 
with their stakeholders’ expected codes of conduct 
and that environmental and social misconducts do 
not occur, while maintaining profitability. The 
proposed framework (Figure 1) highlights the 
“dynamic nature” of requisite supply management 
capabilities and governance mechanisms. This is 
mainly due to the need to creating a strategic fit 
between supply chains and the continually 
changing supply chain risks. This research will use 
multiple regression analysis method with 
moderated regression analysis (MRA) technique. 
The analysis technique of moderated regression 
analysis (MRA) is  an analysis to find out the 
relationship of  influence between a variable to 
other variables where there are moderation 
variables that influence the relationship between 
independent variable to dependent variable as 
stated in the research design in the previous 
section. The following model is used to test the 
hypotheses. 
 
COC = α0 + α1ICDI + α2GCG + α3ICDI*GCG  + 
α4SIZE + α5LEV + e 
 
COC is the cost of capital measured using the 
Ohlson model [14]. This measured as issued in a 
number of studies, for example [2].  ICDI  is  the 
intellectual capital disclosures indexmeasured using 
the content analysis based on [17]. Previous 
studies, [1], also use this measure. GCG is good 
corporate governance index measured using the 
Indonesia of corporate governance rating agency, 
Size is the size of the firm measured as the natural 
logarithm of totalassets. Previous studies, [13], also 
employ this measure.  LEV is leverage measured as 
the ration of total debts over total assets. This 
variable is used in [11]. 
 
Figure 1: supply chain and god governance 
Population 
The population used in this study are 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange over the period of 2013-2015. The 
sample is determined using the following criteria 
company does not engage in  any corporate actions 
during the period of analysis, such as merger or 
acquisition and the company’s annual report is 
accessible. Company with outlier data will  be 
excluded. 
Sample 
Based on the criteria of the sample selection,  a 
total of 83 companies were selected. The sample 
selection procedure can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Selection of Sample  Process 
No. Description Tot
al 1 Company meeting the first two criteria 90 90 
2 Company with outliers data 7 
Final sample 83 83 
 
4. Result and Discussion 
Result 
Supply management governance In this study, the 
vehicle to strengthening the capacity of a supply 
chain to ensure ecological resilience is proposed to 
be via supply management governance; i.e., 
structures and processes intended to coordinate and 
integrate various dimensions of the supply 
management. Governance represents the structures 
and processes by which societies share power, also 
shapes individual and collective actions.  Firms 
should be deliberate in devising and implementing 
appropriate supply management governance 
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mechanisms to safeguard against such market 
imperfections and supply chain uncertainties. Such 
governance mechanisms make it possible to 
achieve supply chain ecological resilience, thus 
enabling the firm to adapt rapidly while retaining 
coherence even as its supply chain  
continues to expand. Table 2 presents the 
descriptive statistics of variables examined in the 
study. As can be seenin the table, the intellectual 
capital disclosure index ranges from 0.0329 to 
0.3406, with an average of 0.2044. This indicates 
that there is a relatively low index value among the 
compaies examined in this study. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
ICDI 0.0329 0.0329 0.2044 0.0679 
ICG 0.5101 0.7975 0.6166 0.2133 
ICDI*ICG 0.0211 0.2218 0.1317 0.0737 
Size 17.4813 28.4638 25.9840 2.9141 
Lev 0.0977 0.7985 0.4086 0.1823 
CoC -0.9853 2.1849 0.1160 0.7787 
 
Similar  results are reported for GCG  index of 
which the average is 0.6166. this figure is 
considerable low. In terms of leverage, on average, 
the companies in this study have a total debt of half 
of their assets. The cost of capital interestingly has 
a negative value. This seems to be strange. In 
addition, the maximum cost of capital is higher 
than 100 percent. This is also strange. 
 
Table 3. Summary  of Results of Hypotheses Testing 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant  -3.136 -2.921 0.005 
ICDI negative 0.772 2.177 0.033 
ICG negative 1.055 2.659 0.010 
ICDI*ICG negative -0.851 -2.637 0.010 
Size negative 0.250 2.369 0.020 
Lev positive -0.005 -0.045 0.964 
R2 (Adj. R2) 0.582 (0.339) 
F-Stat (F-sig) 4.158 (0.000) 
 
The results of hypotheses testing are presented in 
Table 3. As can be seen in Table 3, hypothesis one 
(H1) cannot be accepted as the sign is positive, 
whilst the study predicts it shall be negative. This 
finding is interesting given more  disclosures are 
associated with higher cost of capital.  Similar 
finding is reported for the good corporate 
governance index. A positive coefficient is  
generated. 
Discussion   
The effect of Intellectual Capital Disclosure on 
Cost of Capital 
The results of statistical tests showed that ICDI 
variables have a positive effect on the COC. This 
means that high corporate intellectual capital 
disclosure would increase the cost of capital, which 
indicates that the company’s information  about 
intellectual capital can make  the financial 
statements presented by the company more 
transparent and influence the investor's estimate of 
the risks that exist in the company. Examin ing the 
relationship of intellectual capital disclosure on the 
cost of capital would help managers to understand 
the impact of applying intellectual capital on 
corporate finance. The results of this study are 
consistent with [12] who find evidence that the 
greater the level of accounting disclosure done by 
the company accompanied by good information,  
the lower the cost of capital. 
Moderating Effect of Good Corporate 
Governance on the Relationship between 
Intellectual Capital Disclosure and Cost of 
Capital 
The results of this study indicates that good 
corporate governance has a significant negative 
Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt                                                                                                                                                                            Vol. 9, No. 3, June 2020 
 
460 
effect in moderating the influence of ICDI on cost 
of capital. The results of this study prove that GCG 
is a moderating variable. The effect of ICDI*ICG 
on cost of capital relationship is inversely 
proportional, whereas the higher ICDI*ICG value, 
the lower the cost of capital value. This condition 
reflects that GCG exercises good control over 
managers so that it can lower the capital cost 
incurred by investors. 
This study uses company size control variables 
(Size) and debt ratio (Leverage). Many intellectual 
capital disclosures are often associated with firm 
size. The bigger the company, the lower will be the 
cost of capital. Conversely with leverage ratio, 
companies that have a high leverage will do a lot of 
disclosure that will  eventually lower the cost of 
capital. The results of this study show size has 
positive and significant coefficient. This is strange 
as we expect that larger firm will be associated 
with lower cost of capital. This is consistent with 
research conducted by [23, 25]. Yet, the finding 
reported here  is inconsistent with the one of [14]. 
The coefficient of leverage is insignificant. So, we 
may conclude that leverage level is not related to 
the level of cost of capital. This means that neither 
companies with high leverage or low leverage have 
no effect on intellectual capital disclosure with cost 
of capital issued by the company. 
5. Conclusion  
This  paper   aims  to  analyze   the  role  of  good   
corporate  governance in  supply chain managemnt 
for coping with bad working conditionsn in    
factories in developing economies and related   
environmental problems. Based on the discussion 
the following conclusions are generate. Intellectual 
capital disclosure index has significant positive 
effect on the cost of capital. The interaction 
between intellectual capital disclosure index and   
good   corporate governance generates negative and 
significant effect on cost of  capital. 
The finding reported here clearly imply that good 
corporate governance can serve as a moderating 
variable that reduces the negative impact of 
intellectual capital disclosure index  on cost of 
capital. Good corporate governance has significant 
positive effect on cost of capital. This means that 
corporate governance can serve as a determinant 
variable affecting the cost of capital. 
Limitations and the suggestions that can be offered 
based on the limitations of this study are as follows.  
This s tudy uses a sample of manufacturing 
companies with two years of observation. Further 
research is  suggested to use longer observation 
period, to produce more accurate in showing the 
implications that exist mainly related to the 
disclosure made by the company. This study uses 
the Ohlson's model as a proxy to measure cost of 
capital. Further study may use other proxies such as 
weighted average cost of capital or Residual 
Income  Model. 
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